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Abstract
The effects of interpersonal interactions on individual’s agreements result in a social
aggregation process which is reflected in the formation of collective states, as for
instance, groups of individuals with a similar opinion about a given issue. This field,
which has been a longstanding concern of sociologists and psychologists, has been
extended into an area of experimental social psychology, and even has attracted the
attention of physicists and mathematicians. In this article, we present a novel model
of opinion formation in which agents may either have a strict preference for a choice,
or be undecided. The opinion shift emerges during interpersonal communications, as a
consequence of a cumulative process of conviction for one of the two extremes opinions
through repeated interactions. There are two main ingredients which play key roles in
determining the steady state: the initial fraction of undecided agents and the
conviction’s sensitivity in each interaction. As a function of these two parameters, the
model presents a wide range of possible solutions, as for instance, consensus of each
opinion, bi-polarisation or convergence of undecided individuals. We found that a
minimum fraction of undecided agents is crucial not only for reaching consensus of a
given opinion, but also to determine a dominant opinion in a polarised situation. In
order to gain a deeper comprehension of the dynamics, we also present the theoretical
master equations of the model.
Introduction
When a group of inter-related individuals discuss around a given item, they are
feasible to change their initial opinions in order to get closer to or farther from other
subjects in the group. This interpersonal dynamics leads to different collective
behaviours which could be categorised either by consensus or coexistence of opinions.
If furthermore the topic is a binary statement, as for example a pro-against issue, the
coexistence of opinions turns out to be a polarised state, where a fraction of the group
holds a given opinion and the rest the opposite one.
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These kind of situations lead naturally to questions like: Which are the
mechanisms underlying the formation of these collective states? or, can we predict the
final collective outcomes when different mechanisms compete among them, as for
instance if some individuals tend to agree and others tend to disagree?
A numerical modelling approach could be a powerful tool in order to face these
kind of questions and test how a given interaction mechanism between pair of agents
lead to the formation of collective states. The typical approach to model opinion
formation is to assume that an individual either adopts the opinion of a neighbour or
decides on an opinion based on the average of neighbouring opinions. We take a
different conjecture, that the process of opinion formation is an emergent behaviour of
an underlying dynamics. Here, we develop a novel mathematical model based on the
combination of interaction-based conviction accumulating dynamics and a
threshold-driven opinion change.
In sociological research, the concept of threshold was stated in the seminal papers
of T. Schelling [31] and M. Granovetter [17] in order to understand the micro-macro
link and the aggregation processes. From the psychological perspective,
accumulative-threshold models have been successfully used [33, 34] in order to
understand binary decision making problems.
The formation of opinion’s collective states and the underlying mechanism has
largely studied from sociology and social psychology [1, 4, 11, 19, 20] among others.
There are five main theories to explain group opinion dynamics [10, 12]: Social
comparison theory [3, 11, 30]; Information or Persuasive arguments theory
(PAT) [26, 39]; Self-categorization theory [27, 28, 37]; Social decision theory [7, 18, 21]
and Social influence network theory [12]. Predominantly, these theories are focused on
interpersonal interactions, and it is useful because it draws attention to the emergent
communication patterns. Essentially, it deepens the understanding of group dynamics,
in particular when combined with an appropriate mathematical model.
From a theoretical point of view, much of the existing modelling development
about opinion dynamics has been addressed from a physics-based framework, where
the behavioural mechanism of social influence are derived from analogies with physical
systems, in particular spins [6, 23]. The variety of existing models assume that
individuals hold binary or continuous opinion values (usually lying between -1 and 1),
which are updated over repeated interactions among neighbouring agents. Different
models assume different rules of opinion adaptation, such as imitation [1], averaging
over individuals with similar opinions [40], the majority rule [13], or more
sophisticated rules [25, 36]. The classical models that are based on the mechanisms of
convergence (after interacting, individuals get more similar) predict consensus. The
models which include mechanism of negative influence (disliking of dissimilar ones)
naturally will give place to bi-polarisation. However, in last years new models with
interesting features appeared, as for instance, a model of continuous opinion based on
persuasive arguments theory [24] where bi-polarisation can been produced without
including negative influence explicitly. Another model presented in [22], explores the
competition between the two antagonist mechanisms, as persuasion and compromise,
among agents with different degree of agreement about a given issue.
In this work we present an agent-based model for a population of interdependent
individuals who simultaneously participate in an artificial interaction process. The
individuals can have two opposing views, and also a third state of indefiniteness.
Through the interactions, individuals with opinions drive the undecided ones towards
one of the definite opinions and also undecided agents can wear down the conviction of
decided ones. This gives place to a random cumulative process where individuals can
eventually change their convictions about the issue in question [22, 35] and, when this
conviction overpasses a certain threshold, the opinion changes. Thus, the opinion
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dynamics is an emerging process depending of the underlying evolution of the
conviction of each individual about a given issue. We are mainly interested in the
equilibria reached by this population. We analyse the convergence properties of the
system for wide range of parameter’s values and found that three main collective
states can be seen: bi-polarisation, consensus and convergence of undecided agents.
Moreover, the model shows that the initial fraction of undecided agents could be
crucial in the determination of consensus or the dominance of a given opinion in a
polarised situation. We also analyse how the model can achieve the mentioned
collective states in a regime of initially low concentration of undecided individuals and
finally we sketch the exact dynamical equations in order to frame the model within
the non-linear and non-local first order differential equation formulation.
The article is organised as follows: the model and the interaction dynamics are
presented in section Analysis. The results are presented and discussed in section
Results. We conclude in section Discussion.
Analysis
In order to study the opinion formation process in groups of interrelated people we
develop a simple agent-based model that includes the main relevant features for
modelling the opinion dynamics: convergence (in subsequent interactions individuals
get to similar others) and negative influence (disliking of dissimilar others).
We consider a population of N individuals (i = 1, 2, . . . , N), each one
simultaneously participating in interpersonal communication process, which can be
understood as an exchange of some kind of information between two or more agents
over the issue in question. The population has the following characteristics: each
individual is represented as an agent i, with a numerically valued opinion O(i) which
stands for agent’s posture on a given issue at period t. The opinion variable O(i) can
take three values of attitude towards an issue: positive O(i) = +1, negative1
O(i) = −1, and neutral O(i) = 0.
In addition, the agent i has a conviction about the issue in question, represented by
a variable C(i). This conviction variable C(i) could vary between Cmax and −Cmax,
and represents being fully aligned with the interaction communication or totally
opposed with it.
These two variables are not independent, i.e., if the conviction variable C(i) is
greater than a given positive threshold, C(i) > CT , the agent has a positive opinion
O(i) = +1, and if it is less than a given negative threshold, C(i) < −CT , the agent’s
opinion is negative O(i) = −1. If the conviction held by the agent does not allow him
to decide with any definite position, then the agent is undecided and O(i) = 0 (see
Figure 1 (a)).
Dynamics
We are interested in the equilibria reached by the system when agents meet and
interact in successive periods. We model this as a process where agents may increase
or decrease their convictions depending on whether the opponent in each discussion
has positive or negative opinion. These social interactions produce cumulative changes
that can eventually lead to the change of opinion: a shift in opinion occurs when that
conviction exceeds a certain threshold.
The interaction dynamics between agents is the following: whenever two agents i
and j interact, the agents’ conviction values C(i) and C(j) are modified by an amount
1It is important to remark that, the negative opinion does not have a negative connotation about
the issue in question. The negative sign is due to the numerical representation of the opinion.
3
bounded by k∆, depending on the opinion of both individuals. This parameter, ∆, is
a measure of the sensitivity of the agents to a given interaction.
This social influence mechanism acts as by moving the respective convictions from
their existing positions towards new ones depending of the interacting opponent. This
way the opinion shift is not based on the imitation of opinions of the neighbours (like
the typical imitation behaviours), but is due to a cumulative process of conviction for
one of the two extremes opinions, after repeated interactions.
The presence of the two social ingredients of the interacting dynamics, convergence
and negative influence, will produce an “anti-flocking2 effect”: Distant individuals
repel (caused by mechanism of negative influence) if they differ in opinions and get
attracted by each other if their opinions are similar (mechanism of convergence and
social influence). This last is in line with the fact observed by Wood [42] where
individuals sharing a common attribute tend to get closer in opinions.
More formally, at each period t, the states of the agents after interaction are
updated according to the following rules, also illustrated in Figure 1 (b) :
• If agents share the same opinions, Oi(t) = Oj(t), and Ci(t) > Cj(t) then they get
attracted (agents influence each other so that their convictions become more
similar)
Ci(t) = Ci(t)−∆,
Cj(t) = Cj(t) + ∆.
• If agents hold different opinions, Oi(t) = +1, and Oj(t) = −1 then they repel
Ci(t) = Ci(t) + ∆,
Cj(t) = Cj(t)−∆.
If one of the agents has an opinion and another one is undecided, then they get
attracted. In this case the dynamics is asymmetric simulating the fact that is
not the same convincing someone who does not have any opinion yet or making
someone change his opinion:
• If Oi = −1 and Oj = 0 then
Ci(t) = Ci(t) + ∆,
Cj(t) = Cj(t)− k∆.
• If Oi = +1 and Oj = 0 then
Ci(t) = Ci(t)−∆,
Cj(t) = Cj(t) + k∆.
In the way the rules are actually written, some anomalous behaviour can arise for
large values of ∆. For instance, if two agents have very similar convictions, they
should be attracted. But if ∆ is larger than the difference of their convictions, it
would happen that after the interaction they will be more distant in their convictions.
In order to avoid these kind of undesirable behaviours, we set ∆eff =
|C(i)−C(j)|
2 if
|C(i)− C(j)| < ∆.
The main parameters of the model are:
2In flocking, two distant agents get attracted, but closer ones repel (the birds want to fly together,
but not crashing).
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- ∆ is a sensitivity parameter which measures how much the conviction of an
agent changes after each interaction. The smaller it is, the more agents who
share the same opinion are needed to convince him.
- P0 is the initial fraction of undecided agents.
- CT is the threshold beyond which the agent is no longer undecided and adopts
an opinion.
- k is a variable which simulates an asymmetry dynamics between an undecided
agent and the one with a formed opinion. Values k > 1 imply that the
conviction’s change of the undecided is modified by a factor k with respect to
the other one.
Given the details of the interaction dynamics we are interested in the following
question: Do the interactions among the agents with different opinions bring the
group to consensus o bi-polarisation?
We present the results of simulations in the next sections. All the simulations are
done for systems with N = 1000 agents. Results are averages over ensembles
Nev = 1000 equivalent configurations, corresponding to different realisations of the
random initial conditions.
Results
In this section we present the steady states of the model and discuss its properties as a
function of the relevant parameters. The aggregate behaviour is characterised in terms
of the fraction of agents who state an opinion i, Si, where i = {+,−, 0}. Given that
Si(t) is a function of time, we call Pi ≡ Si(0) the initial fraction of agents who has an
opinion i, and Ti ≡ Si(tasint) the fraction of agents who have come to a definite
position on an issue or have ”no opinion” at convergence.
There are two features of the model that, a priory, are preferred to be fixed: first,
opinions should be equally likely; second, it is assumed to be easier for agents who are
undecided to adopt a particular opinion because they have got persuaded, than for
those who have an opinion to turn into ”undecided”. The first one is implemented in a
way that once the initial fraction of undecided agents, P0, is chosen, the rest of the
agents are equally distributed with both opinions (±1). When we change this
condition, we will call P+ the fraction of agents with O = +1 after the undecided are
assigned. The second one is achieved by setting k = 2. The conviction of each agent is
chosen at random from an uniform distribution within each opinion.
For better description and interpreting interaction effects is especially useful to
take in Figure 1.
Equilibrium States
We start with analysing the steady states Ti ≡ Si(tasint) as a function of P0 and ∆.
We vary them 0.01 ≤ P0 ≤ 0.99 and 0.01 ≤ ∆ ≤ 1.0 with steps of 0.01
1. Results are
obtained with asynchronous updating where the procedure is iterated until
convergence.
As a result of simulations, the system converges to one of these four equilibrium
states:
1
P0 = 0 and P0 = 1 are already the equilibrium absorbing states, in both cases the interaction will
not change the opinions of the agents. If initially all agents are undecided, they will remain undecided.
On the contrary, if agents are equally distributed between the two extreme opinions, the distribution
of opinions will remain unchanged.
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(a) All undecided agents (Oi = 0 ∀i).
(b) Positive Consensus (Oi = +1 ∀i).
(c) Negative Consensus (Oi = −1 ∀i).
(d) Bi-Polarisation (fractions of agents having O = +1 and O = −1).
The steady state is reached when T0 = 1 or T0 = 0, i.e. agents are either all
undecided or all have an opinion. Given the constraint S0(t) + S+(t) + S−(t) = 1 (∀t),
if T0 = 0, the only possible equilibria are either consensus of one of the extreme
opinion (b-c) or bi-polarisation (d).
If we look at the system in terms of the fraction of undecided agents, there is a
transition from T0 = 1 to T0 = 0 (i.e. there are no longer agents who have ”no
opinion”). This transition depends on the value of P0 and ∆. This result is due to a
nonlinear nature of the underlying opinion forming dynamics, and is different to what
is observed in a reference paper [38]. The authors examined a three-state
generalisation of the voter model where two states (”rightists” and ”leftists”) are
incompatible and interact with a third state (”centrists”) to impose their consensus.
In this case the dynamics can settle in a polarised state consisting only of leftists and
rightists.
Figure 2 shows the Fundamental Phase Diagram (FPD) that depicts existence of
different regions of the system under equilibrium. In this Phase Diagram we analyse
the prevalence of each equilibria for every pair of values of P0 and ∆ within the
specific range. Be 〈Ti〉 (i = {+,−, 0}) the ensamble average of Ti, the larger value of
〈Ti〉 will determine the dominant solution.
The Phase Diagram exhibits three different regions (see Figure 2):
Region I, delimited by large values of P0 and small values of ∆, where the
equilibrium state is characterised by the convergence of undecided agents (i.e.
O = 0 ∀i).
Region II, delimited by large values of P0 and intermediate values of ∆, where the
equilibrium state is characterised by the consensus of one of the extreme
opinions (O = +1 or O = −1). This is the most unusual result because it is
accompanied with the implicit symmetry breaking in this region.
Region III, delimited by low values of P0 when ∆ is small and by all values of P0
when ∆ is large, where the steady state is defined by a bi-polarisation of opinion,
i.e. fractions of agents having O = +1 and O = −1.
Figure 1 can be used again to illustrate a bit more intuitively how agents interact
through this model. When a pair of facing individuals interact, there are two
mechanisms that take place: the first trying to gather together those who share the
same opinion, and the second that makes agents change opinions. For example, if both
agents are undecided they will keep their positions and get closer in their convictions.
If one is undecided and another has an opinion, both will modify their convictions, but
the former will get more similar to the other one, which may eventually make him
adopt a position. Due to this kind of repeated interactions these agents will eventually
get closer to the thresholds {−CT , CT } (see Figure 1 (a)). On the other hand, if both
have opinions they will not change them, but they will modify their convictions: either
approaching them (if both share the same opinion) or dissociating them (if otherwise).
Synthesising, there are exist two competing opposite forces: first, which drives agents
to the center in the conviction space (turning them to ”undecided”), another which
drives agents to its extremes, forcing bi-polarisation of opinions. The final result of
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mutual interactions depends on the initial fraction of undecided agents P0, and the
sensitivity parameter ∆ (see Figure 2).
When ∆ is small, the situation is dominated by agents that change convictions
very little after pairwise interactions. Thus, many of these interpersonal relationships
are needed in order to force a change in their opinions. Here, the fraction P0 is
important because it determines what will be the final state of this dynamics (all
undecided (〈T0〉 = 1) or none (〈T0〉 = 0)).
Instead, when ∆ increases, the preference for an agent to adopt extreme opinions
(due to the asymmetry given by k, see Figure 1(b)) is more evident and is reflected in
the fact that the more initially undecided agents are needed in order for the system to
reach the final state with “all undecided”. As a consequence, the border of Region I
grows monotonically with ∆ until enclosing with P0 = 1. When ∆ is large, the final
state is bi-polarisation (Region III) independently of the initial density of undecided
agents.
Consensus and Bi-Polarisation
Given a global picture of the stable solutions, we look in details at the dynamics which
makes the systems reach these states. Furthermore, we restrict the discussion to
Regions II and III where the equilibrium states are consensus and bi-polarisation,
respectively, because Region I does not represent any interest neither from the social
nor the individual point of view 3.
Region III deserves a closer look. On average, the distribution of T+ and T− (the
fraction of agents who have an opinion and the fraction of undecided agents at
convergence, respectively) is 50%− 50%, and depends on P0 and ∆.
On Figure 3 we plot the distribution of positive opinions, T+, and its average, 〈T+〉
as a function of P0 for different values of ∆. It can be observed that, as well as the
dynamics is confined to Region III, the averaged value of positive opinion is fifty
percent, i.e., 〈T+〉 = 0.5. However, the behaviour of the distribution of positive
(negative) opinion depends on P0 and ∆. For example, for ∆ = 0.01, a clear bimodal
distribution emerges (see Figure 3 (a)). It can be observed that the mean value of each
branch depends linearly on P0, either increasing or decreasing. This behaviour can be
understood if we look at Figure 3(b), where the dynamics of the fraction of agents
with a given opinion (Si, i = {+,−, 0}) is plotted against time for different values of
P0. Here it can be seen that as the system approaches the final state, almost total
number of undecided agents adopts massively either one of the two opinions with the
same probability. If for example, there are initially 20% of undecided agents, it means
that there are 40% of agents with positive opinion and 40% of agents with negative
opinion. Due to the dynamics, the system will converge either to the state with 60%
(T+ = 0.60) or 40% with positive opinions (T+ = 0.40). When P0 = 0.1 the final states
for T+ will be 0.45 or 0.55, corresponding to closer values of the mean of the bimodal
distribution. But if P0 = 0.30 then T+ will be 0.35 or 0.65 corresponding to the
regions where the two branches are more distant from each other.
Region II is the most interesting one, given that all agents adopt, equally likely,
one of the two extreme opinions. This region expresses the range of parameter values
where a given opinion prevails and it involves a symmetry breaking in the dynamics.
In Figure 4 we plot the average opinion dynamics as a function of time for P0 = 0.80
and ∆ = 0.55. If we look at the fraction of undecided agents, it can be seen that after
a slight decrease it reaches more than 80% of the population, and then it decreases
monotonically until disappears. When it happens, just one of the two opinion survives.
3For example, the statistics on undecided voters indicate that most individuals have pre-existing
beliefs when it comes to politics, and relatively few people remain undecided late into high-profile
elections [32]
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We also explored the impact produced on the Fundamental Phase Diagram when
the threshold CT and the asymmetry parameter k are modified. Increasing the
threshold makes the intermediate interval of the conviction space, which defines agents
to be undecided, to be bigger. Less undecided are needed initially (at t = 0) in order
to have more of them at the end. This moves the transition T0 = 0→ T0 = 1 down
(see Figure 5 (a)). This in turn, results in the final disappearance of Region II, which
produces that Region I becomes dominant in the phase space. Decreasing the
threshold produces the opposite effect: the polarisation Region III becomes bigger.
Instead, with increasing k, grows the tendency to adopt a definite opinion (+/− 1)
after each interaction, and therefore, more undecided individuals are needed in order
to achieve a final state where they predominate. Thus, this moves the transition up
(see Figure 5 (b)). When the asymmetry parameter is changed, the model moves
between a pragmatic null ”symmetric” model (k = 1) and a more extreme asymmetric
case (k > 2). With large k, the polarization region becomes dominant.
How many undecided are relevant?
In real social situations, the value of P0 depends on the underlying context, and it may
be large or small. Clearly, if we consider examples of voting elections, then assuming
very large values of P0 is less feasible. It is hard to imagine a social system where
there is a huge percentage of undecided voters4. In fact, voting must be considered
carefully because the term “undecide” requires correct precision according to
Gordon [16], and Galdi [14].
Instead, social examples of college decision (up to 50% of students enter college as
“undecide” [16]) or the choice of major (an estimated 75% of students change their
major at least once before graduation [16]) present situations where large values of P0
are justified.
In the previous section we showed that, for small values of ∆, when the initial
fraction of undecided agents, P0 is large, the system presents three solutions, and
when P0 is small the equilibrium is bi-polarisation. Thus, we are interested in the next
question: in systems with a relatively small fraction P0 what should be undertaken in
order to obtain the equilibria states observed previously.
We propose an alternative scenario for the interaction dynamics. Instead of
implemented repulsive effect, allow the individuals with opposite opinions repel with
some positive probability Pr, in a similar way it was treated in [22]. The concentration
of undecided is fixed. The Phase Diagram for P+ vs Pr (Repulsion probability) for
initially low concentration of undecided agents and a small value of ∆ (P0 = 0.10 and
∆ = 0.01) is presented in Figure 6.
When Pr = 1, agents with opposite opinions always repel and the equilibrium is a
polarised state found in the Phase Diagram on Figure 2. When Pr < 1, agents sharing
opposite opinions may get attracted with probability (1− Pr), and the steady state
depends on the bias to any opinion. If any of the opinion initially prevails, then the
population will reach the consensus to this opinion. Otherwise, a convergence to “all
undecided” for Pr < 0.40 approx. is reached.
The two scenarios for the interaction dynamics analysed here are interesting from
the social point of view because, in turn, they correspond to the two different sides of
the public debate: “Do we learn more from the people with opposite opinions of our
own?”. On one side there is a view that we learn much more from people with similar
opinions because we do learn more arguments fortifying that belief and take things as
facts. On the other side, there is a view that we only learn if we look beyond: in a
4According to the literature and web survey, this number varies between 10− 15%
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discussion with people with opposing thoughts we see the different points of view, the
exchange of thoughts, etc.
Theoretical Approach
In order to gain a deeper comprehension of the dynamics of this model, we present in
this section the master equations corresponding to the dynamics of the systems. We
look at the system as composed by three populations, according the opinions of the
agents. Lets recall than an agent with opinion O = +1 has a conviction
C ∈ [CT , Cmax], another with O = 0 has C ∈ [CT ,−CT ] and an individual with
O = −1 has C ∈ [−Cmax,−CT ]. We divide the interval corresponding to each opinion
in M = ∆−1 subintervals. Given the evolution of the conviction according to the
interaction-evolution rules detailed in previous sections, the best way to describe the
dynamics of the model is in terms of the density of agents with a given conviction.
With this goal we define this density for 1 ≤ j ≤M and t ≥ 0,
s+(j, t) =
#{i ∈ [CT + (j − 1)∆, CT + j∆)}
N
,
s0(j, t) =
#{i ∈ [−CT + (j − 1)∆,−CT + j∆)}
N
,
s−(j, t) =
#{i ∈ [−CT − (j − 1)∆,−CT − j∆)}
N
,
which represent the fraction of agent of each opinion with conviction in each interval
of length ∆. In this way we can obtain a coupled system of 3M difference equations
governing the evolution of the density of agents.
We call Sk≤ji (t) =
∑j
k=1 si(j, t), S
k≥j
i (t) =
∑M
k=j si(j, t), and recall that Si(t) is the
fraction of agents with opinion i, where i ∈ {+,−, 0}.
In the following, we omit the variable t in the right hand side of the equations for
brevity. After some characteristic time τ , depending on the rate of the interactions, we
have that the variation on the density of agents is given by the balance between gain
and loss terms. For example, when O = −1, we have
s−(j, t+ τ) − s−(j, t) = G−(j, t) − L−(j, t)
where the term G− corresponds to those agents located at j − 1 which interact with
an agent with opinion O = +1 or an agent with opinion O = −1 and a stronger
conviction, plus those agents located at j + 1 which interact with an agent with
neutral opinion O = 0 or an agent with opinion O = −1 and a weaker conviction:
G−(j, t) = 2s−(j − 1)[S+ + S
k≥j
− ] + 2s−(j + 1)[S0 + S
k≤j
− ].
On the other hand, the loss term corresponds to interactions between an agent located
at j with another agent in any other location,
L−(j, t) = −2s−(j)[1− s−(j)].
So, in this way we obtain the following system of equations:
s−(j, t+ τ) − s−(j, t) = −2s−(j)[1 − s−(j)] + 2s−(j − 1)[S+ + S
k≥j
− ]
+2s−(j + 1)[S0 + S
k≤j
− ],
s+(j, t+ τ) − s+(j, t) = −2s+(j)[1 − s+(j)] + 2s−(j − 1)[S− + S
k≥j
+ ]
+2s+(j + 1)[S0 + S
k≤j
+ ],
s0(j, t+ τ) − s0(j, t) = −2s0(j)[1 − s0(j)] + 2s0(j − 1)S
k≥j
+ + 2s0(j + 1)S
k≤j
+
+2s0(j + k)S− + 2s0(j − k)S+
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for 2 < j < M .
For j = 1, 2 and M , the equations are slightly different, as for instance can be seen
for s−:
s−(1, t+ τ)− s−(1, t) = −2s−(1)[1− s−(1)] + 2s0(2)S−
+2s−(2)[S0 + S
k≤1
− ],
s−(2, t+ τ)− s−(2, t) = −2s−(2)[1− s−(2)] + 2s−(1)[S+ + S
k≥2
− ]
+2s−(j + 1)[S0 + S
k≤j
− ] + 2s0(1)S−,
s−(M, t+ τ) − s−(M, t) = −2s−(M)[1− s−(M)] + 2s−(M − 1)[S+ + s−(M)],
Up to here, we can see that the equations are rather difficult to study, but we can
gain more perspective if we move from this discrete version to a continuous model. We
can do that by introducing (smooth) functions ui(x, t), i ∈ {0,+,−}, defined for
(x, t) ∈ [0, 1]× [0,∞) such that
ui(j∆, t) = si(j, t),
and we can approximate the spatial partial derivative as
∆∂xui(j∆, t) ≈ si(j + 1, t)− si(j, t) ≈ si(j, t)− si(j − 1, t), (1)
and the temporal partial derivative as
τ∂tui(j∆, t) ≈ si(j, t+ τ)− si(j, t).
Also,
Sk≥ji (t) ≈
∫ j∆
0
ui(y, t)dy, S
k≤j
i (t) ≈
∫ 1
j∆
ui(y, t)dy,
We assume that τ = ∆, which corresponds to a time scaling of the rate of interactions.
After some algebra, the continuous version of the master equations reads as
1
2
∂tu−(x, t) = ∂x
[
u−(x, t)
( ∫ x
0
u−(y, t)dy −
∫ 1
x
u−(y, t)dy
)]
+∂x
[
u−(x, t)
( ∫ 1
0 u0(y, t)dy −
∫ 1
0 u+(y, t)dy
)
,
1
2
∂tu+(x, t) = ∂x
[
u+(x, t)
( ∫ x
0 u+(y, t)dy −
∫ 1
x
u+(y, t)dy
)]
+∂x
[
u+(x, t)
( ∫ 1
0
u0(y, t)dy −
∫ 1
0
u+(y, t)dy
)
,
1
2
∂tu0(x, t) = ∂x
[
u0(x, t)
( ∫ x
0
u0(y, t)dy −
∫ 1
x
u0(y, t)dy
)]
+2∂x
[
u−(x, t)
( ∫ 1
0 u0(y, t)dy −
∫ 1
0 u+(y, t)dy
)
.
The boundary conditions for s− are given by
u−(0, t) =
( ∫
1
0
u
−
(y,t)dy
∫
1
0
u
−
(y,t)dy+
∫
1
0
u+(y,t)dy
)
2u0(0, t),
∂xu−(M, t) = 0,
and the ones corresponding to u+ are similar. The no flux boundary condition at
x = 1 follows from the assumption that the convictions are saturated at ±Cmax. For
u0, there are two non zero Dirichlet boundary conditions similar to the one for
u−(0, t), reflecting the incoming agents with opinions O = ±1.
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In this way we obtain a nonlinear coupled system of first order differential
equations of hyperbolic type including nonlocal terms and nonlocal boundary
conditions.
Let us remark that there are few models of this type, even for a single equation.
The works of Deffuant, Neau, Amblard and Weisbuch, see [8, 41] in opinion dynamic
models where only agents with similar opinions can interact, present spatial dependent
nonlocal terms involving a small neighbourhood of a given opinion. However, in these
models the nonlocal terms were replaced by Taylor expansions, and porous media and
Fokker-Planck type equations arise.
True nonlocal terms appear in few works. We can cite for instance the work of
Aletti, Naldi and Toscani [2], where the authors studied a model of opinion formation,
and the mean value of the opinions m(t) appears in the transport term,
∂tu = γ∂x
(
(1− x2)(x −m(t))u
)
, (x, t) ∈ [0, 1]× (0,∞),
here γ ∈ [−1, 1], and m(t) =
∫ 1
0 yu(y, t)dy. With a different motivation, inspired in the
dislocation dynamic of crystals, Ghorbel and Monneau considered in [15] the following
equation:
∂tu =
(
c(x) +
∫
R
ϕ(u(x − y, t))dy
)
∂xu, (x, t) ∈ R× (0,∞),
similar equations appeared in continuum mechanics in the theory of deformations and
fractures, see for example [9] and the references therein.
It is worth noticing that there are few theoretical results and numerical methods
for these problems, which are under active research. These kind of difficulties, as well
as the novelty of the model and the numerical results obtained above, makes that we
let the solutions of this equations for future work that is currently in research.
However, few remarks are in order, which are out of the scope of this paper and
deserve a lengthier discussion:
• We have obtained a system of transport equations, and the total mass of the
solution is conserved, that is, for every t ≥ 0,
u−(t) + u+(t) + u0(t) = 1.
Some mathematical properties of the solution, like positivity, seems difficult to
prove, although the model clearly generates nonnegative solutions.
• The partial differential equation for each opinion has two competing terms: a
coalescent one,
∂x
[
u−(x, t)
( ∫ x
0
u−(y, t)dy −
∫ 1
x
u−(y, t)dy
)]
depending on the own distribution ui, which tends to concentrate the agents
around the mean value of the opinion i; and the other one is a pure transport
term,
∂x
[
u−(x, t)
( ∫ 1
0
u0(y, t)dy −
∫ 1
0
u+(y, t)dy
)
,
which drives the population to ±Cmax, ±CT depending on the densities of the
other two populations, as was shown in previous sections.
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• The coalescent terms ∂x
[
ui(x, t)
( ∫ x
0
ui(y, t)dy −
∫ 1
x
ui(y, t)dy
)]
changes signs,
suggesting the existence of shocks (perhaps they are smoothed by the transport
term). Let us suppose that
∫ 1
0 ui(y, t)dy ∼ C, and let us call µi(t) the median of
the distribution ui, i.e., ∫ µi(t)
0
ui(y, t)dy =
C
2
.
We can rewrite the equation as
1
2
∂tui = ∂x
[
ui(x, t)
(
2
∫ x
0
ui(y, t)dy − C
)]
,
and, for x ∈ (0, µ(t)), the characteristic curves travel from left to right, and for
x ∈ (µ(t), 1) they travel from right to left. Hence, we can expect the formation of
a shock curve along the trajectory of µi(t).
Discussion
In this manuscript we have presented a three-state general opinion formation model
based on the hypothesis of an underlying cumulative conviction-threshold dynamics
produced by repeated interactions in a social environment. Given that each agent can
have two opposite opinions or be in an undecided state, this models apply only for
circumstances like a pro-against issue.
We have presented the main stationary results of the numerical simulations as a
function of the relevant parameters and we found that the model is able to reproduce
all the expected collective behaviours. In their initial formulation the model shows, as
a function of ∆, three different collective states: convergence of undecided, consensus
of either of the two opinions and bi-polarisation. Multiple stable states are only
possible for large values of P0, the initial fraction of undecided agents. A situation
where most of individuals are initially undecided could be presented in low
information scenarios about the topic in debate, as for example the discussion about
the environmental impact of fracking in US [5], or college decisions [16].
A paradigmatic scenario of low values of P0 is, for instance, a two-candidate
political election, where typical values of undecided in previous poll give percentages
around 10− 15%. The initial formulation of the model predicts bi-polarisation as the
only possible collective state for this range of values of P0. This is due to the repulsion
mechanism assumed in the model by which two individuals with opposite opinions
repel from each other. If we relax this condition and let the system start from a
non-symmetric initial condition as was explained in previous section, the model can
also show the same three mentioned collective states as a function of Pr and P+, as is
shown in Figure 6.
The presented model has very basic assumptions, as for instance, all the agents are
identical (all have the same threshold) and the sensitivity in their convictions after
each interaction is not partner-dependent. Also each agent can interact with everyone
and there is no any social network underlying the interaction among them. But even in
this simple scenario, the model presents a very rich behaviour, with different collective
states appearing in different parameter’s region. After the deep analysis presented
here, the role and analysis of the mentioned heterogeneities is let for further work.
Along the results shown in this manuscript, we were able not only to do a detailed
analysis of the numerical simulations of different features of this model, but also to
give a glimpse to a theoretical approach of this model. In the corresponding section,
we were able to write down the exact master equations for the evolution of the
probability of having a given conviction C, si (i = +.−, 0) and sketch a set of
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difference equations for this variables. The equations are easily put in context in their
continuous version. Then, it can be seen that the master equations are a nonlinear
coupled system of first order differential equations of hyperbolic type including
nonlocal terms and nonlocal boundary conditions. As long as we know, there are
rather few works in solving this kind of equations and the difficulties they present to
be solved, as was mentioned in the corresponding section. We let the solution of these
equations for future work that is currently under research.
Finally, we would like to mention the potentiality of this model. This formulation
is general and covers the social main stream theories of group opinion dynamics. In
particular, it is compatible with the persuasive argument theory. The effect of
persuasive arguments can be modelled by introducing the set of arguments available to
individuals for an interpersonal communication arguments exchange as was done
in [24]. The model is also consistent with social decision theory, because from a purely
formal point of view, one can assume any mechanism for opinion revision, be it
weighted averages of the group initial opinions, or imitation dynamics of the
neighbours if the networks of interactions is included, etc. Also, the model may be
generalised to self-categorisation theory, similar to Salzarulo [29]. We leave these
extensions for future work.
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Figure 1: Schematic representation of the opinion dynamics. Panel (a): Re-
lation between conviction (C) and opinion (O). Each conviction interval
([−Cmax,C−T ], [−CT , CT ], [CT , Cmax]) defines one of the three opinion values (O =
−1, 0,+1 respectively). Moreover, each interval is divided in sub-intervals of length
∆. For our simulations we choose CT = 1 and |Cmax| = 3 (in Figure 5 CT takes other
values also) such as all conviction interval has the same length. Panel (b): Description
of how conviction is modified by the pairwise interaction dynamics for three different
cases: Same opinion (top panel), opposite opinions (middle panel) and defined opinion
vs undecided.
Figure Legends
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Figure 2: Fundamental Phase Diagram: Dominant steady state solution as a function of
P0 and ∆. We identify three different regions: Region I, convergence of undecided; Re-
gion II, consensus of opinions +1/-1 and Region III, bi-polarisation. In the simulations
CT = 1, k = 2, Cmax = 3 were used.
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Figure 3: Bi-polarisation Region. Panel (a): Distribution of positive opinions (T+) and
its average (< T+ >) as a function of P0 for ∆ = 0.01. Panel (b): Fraction of agents
with opinion O = +1 (S+(t), black), O = −1 (S−(t),red) and undecided (S0(t), green)
as a function of time for different undecided initial concentration (From top to bottom:
P0=0.20, P0=0.30, P0=0.40, P0=0.50).
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Figure 4: Averaged opinion dynamics in region II of the Fundamental Phase Diagram.
The plot shows the averaged evolution in time for each opinion dynamics (< S+ >, black,
< S− >, red and < S0 >, green). It can be observed that undecided population grows
until it reach a value above 80% in the first time steps but finally one of the populations
with defined opinions becomes dominant with the same probability. Evolutions are
averaged over Nev = 10000. P0 = 0.80, ∆ = 0.55.
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Figure 5: Alternative Phase Diagram. Panel (a): Regions of dominant solution as a
function of P0 and CT for ∆ = 0.01. This plot shows that in the low ∆ region and with
symmetric distribution of opposite opinions, the systems evolves either to bi-polarisation
or convergence of undecided, depending of the initial fraction of undecided individuals,
as have been seen in the Fundamental Phase Diagram (Figure 2). Panel (b): Same plot
for P0 vs k and ∆ = 0.01. In both cases, the main difference of the Fundamental Phase
Diagram is the dependence of the transition between Region I and III with CT and k
respectively, as it is explained in the main text.
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Figure 6: Another Alternative Phase Diagram. Regions of dominant solution as a
function of P+ (Bias) and Pr (Repulsion probability) for initially low undecided concen-
tration and small ∆ (P0 = 0.10 and ∆ = 0.01). If Pr = 1, individuals with opposite
opinions always repel and the steady state is a polarised situation as we found in the
Phase Diagram of Figure 2. When Pr < 1, it can happen that agents with opposite
opinions get attracted and the steady state depends on the bias to some opinion. If
some of the opinion initially prevails, then the population will go to the consensus of
this opinion. Otherwise, a convergence of undecided agents for Pr < 0.40 approx. is
reached.
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